Does Roderick Chisholm succeed in solving the problem of intentionality within a person-relational framework, or does the problem remain philosophically unsolved without presupposing God?

This question lies at the heart of contemporary philosophy of mind and its relationship to philosophy of religion. Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999) in his works from "Perceiving" (1957) to "The First Person" (1981) developed one of the most influential attempts to solve the problem of intentionality. His attempt deserves careful analysis, especially in light of the question: can the problem of intentionality be solved without presupposing God?

Inadequate Responses to Avoid

From some defenders of Chisholm:

"Chisholm definitively solved the problem of intentionality." An exaggerated claim. Chisholm provided an important framework, but contemporary discussions show that the problem has not been definitively solved.

"The person-relational framework is entirely sufficient." This ignores the fundamental criticism: how does intentionality originally arise in a purely physical world?

From some critics:

"Intentionality necessarily requires God." A metaphysical leap that needs justification. There are serious naturalistic attempts (Millikan, Dretske, Fodor) that deserve consideration.

"Chisholm offered nothing new." Inaccurate. His analysis of intentionality and its logical marks was pioneering and remains foundational.

The Problem of Intentionality: The Philosophical Challenge

Intentionality is the "directedness" of mental states toward objects. Belief "about" something, desire "for" something, fear "of" something. This directedness poses a deep philosophical puzzle: how can a physical state in the brain be "about" something else?

Franz Brentano (1874) proposed intentionality as the distinguishing mark of the mental from the physical. Physical things merely exist; mental states "point to" or "are about" objects.

The challenge: in a purely physical world, how does this "directional relation" arise? Molecules and atoms don't "point to" anything. How does intentional directedness emerge from non-intentional matter?

Chisholm's Framework: Person-Relational Analysis

Stage One: Logical Marks of Intentionality

Chisholm identified three logical marks distinguishing intentional statements:

1. Intentional inexistence: One can think about non-existent objects (unicorn, Pegasus).
2. Non-substitutivity: Replacing synonymous terms may change truth value ("believes the morning star is bright" ≠ "believes the evening star is bright").
3. Scope ambiguity: Intentional statements contain ambiguity in the scope of logical quantification.

This logical analysis was pioneering and remains foundational in philosophy of intentionality.

Stage Two: Basic Personal Framework

Chisholm proposed that intentionality is a basic property of persons. A person is not merely a physical body, but a being capable of:
- Direct perception
- Intentional action
- Reflective thinking

Intentionality is understood as a basic relation between the person and objects of their thinking. This relation is primitive, not reducible to physical relations.

Stage Three: Relational Construction

Intentional states are analyzed as complex relations:
- Belief: a triadic relation between person, propositional content, and time.
- Desire: a relation between person, possible state of affairs, and evaluative attitude.
- Perception: a direct relation between person and perceived object.

This construction avoids reducing intentionality to purely physical relations while maintaining precision in logical analysis.

Critique of the Chisholmian Solution

First Critique: The Problem of Metaphysical Foundation

Chisholm assumes "persons" as basic entities with intentional capacities. But where do these capacities come from? If the universe is fundamentally physical, how did beings with intentionality emerge?

Daniel Dennett: Chisholm places intentionality in the "black box" of personhood without explaining how it arose. This is "hiding the problem, not solving it."

Possible reply: Chisholm practices "descriptive philosophy" — describing intentionality as we experience it, not claiming to explain its evolutionary emergence. This is a legitimate philosophical project.

Second Critique: The Problem of Naturalization

The person-relational framework doesn't provide a "naturalization" of intentionality — explaining it within the natural scientific framework. This makes intentionality a "miracle" in a physical world.

Fred Dretske and Ruth Millikan: Intentionality must be explained evolutionarily and biologically, not merely described philosophically.

Possible reply: Perhaps intentionality doesn't admit complete naturalization. Thomas Nagel in "Mind and Cosmos" (2012) argues that intentionality reveals the limits of naturalism.

Third Critique: The Problem of Content

How do intentional states acquire their specific content? Why is my belief "about" water rather than H₂O or transparent liquid?

Jerry Fodor: Chisholm doesn't explain "content determination" — how a mental state connects to one specific content rather than another.

Possible reply: Chisholm relies on "direct perception" — we know the content of our intentional states directly, not inferentially. This may be sufficient descriptively, even if not explanatorily.

The Theological Dimension: Does Intentionality Require God?

The Argument from Intentionality to God

Richard Swinburne and Robert Adams developed an argument from intentionality:

1. Intentionality is a basic property of minds.
2. Non-intentional matter cannot produce intentionality.
3. Human intentionality requires an original intentional source.
4. This source is the divine mind.

The argument is strong but debatable. Point 2 is most controversial.

The Naturalistic Critique

Naturalists argue that intentionality can arise gradually:
- Primitive intentionality in simple organisms (bacteria moving toward food).
- Complex intentionality evolves through natural selection.
- Full human intentionality as evolutionary product.

Daniel Dennett in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" (1995): Intentionality is "designed" by natural selection, needs no designer.

The Philosophical Response

Thomas Nagel (atheist but critic of naturalism): Intentionality poses a radical challenge to naturalism. The transition from "biological orientation" (bacteria toward food) to "conceptual intentionality" (thinking about abstract concepts) is not merely a difference of degree, but qualitative difference.

Alvin Plantinga: Intentionality with cognitive reliability points to divine design. Unguided evolution doesn't guarantee the reliability of our cognitive faculties.

Chisholm and the Theological Question

Chisholm himself was cautious about directly linking intentionality and God. His position:

- Intentionality is a basic property of persons.
- Persons are basic metaphysical entities.
- This doesn't logically entail God's existence, but is compatible with it.

In "Person and Object" (1976), Chisholm leans toward property dualism: persons have mental and physical properties, and mental properties (including intentionality) are irreducible.

Contemporary Philosophical Assessment

Strengths in Chisholm's Framework:

1. Analytical precision: His logical analysis of intentionality remains foundational.
2. Phenomenological fidelity: Respects our direct experience of intentionality.
3. Avoiding reductionism: Doesn't reduce intentionality to something else (behavior, function, brain states).

Weaknesses:

1. Absence of genetic explanation: Doesn't explain how intentionality emerged.
2. Metaphysical problem: Assumes entities (persons) with intentional properties without sufficient justification.
3. Interaction problem: How do intentional properties interact with the physical world?

Current Debate Positions (2018-2026)

The "intentionality and phenomenal consciousness" current (Kriegel, Horgan, Loar) links intentionality to consciousness. Intentionality is "grounded" in phenomenal consciousness.

The "representational intentionality" current (Dretske, Tye, Lycan) attempts to naturalize intentionality through theories of representation and information.

The "intentionality as social practice" current (Brandom, Haugeland) sees intentionality as a social-linguistic phenomenon, not individual.

The "contemporary natural theology" current (Plantinga, Swinburne, Moreland) develops arguments from intentionality to design.

Where We Stand in This Debate Today

The debate about intentionality has undergone notable shifts between 2020 and 2026. Naturalization projects (Dretske, Millikan) haven't achieved the hoped-for consensus; the problem of the "explanatory gap" between biological orientation and conceptual intentionality remains. Generative artificial intelligence (GPT, LLMs) has sharply revived the question: do these systems possess genuine intentionality or functional simulation empty of content? Most philosophers of mind lean toward the latter option, reinforcing Chisholm's position that intentionality cannot be reduced to computational processing. Meanwhile, the phenomenal intentionality current with Kriegel and Mendelovici advances as a middle ground between Dretske's reductionism and Chisholm's descriptivism, but faces the same question: what is the metaphysical foundation of phenomenal consciousness itself? Contemporary natural theology (Moreland, Reppert) increasingly exploits this gap, while prominent naturalists like Nagel acknowledge that the current materialist framework is inadequate.

From the Perspective of Rational Preponderance (rajḥān ʿaqlī)

Chisholm didn't solve the problem of intentionality, but he clarified it with precision that makes avoiding it more difficult. The cumulative balance proceeds as follows:

- Conceptual intentionality is a genuine property irreducible to purely physical states — this is acknowledged even by Chisholm's most serious critics.
- Evolutionary naturalization attempts explain primitive biological orientation, but don't bridge the qualitative gap toward abstract intentionality (thinking about numbers, impossibilities, nothingness).
- The theistic framework provides a structurally simpler explanation: human intentionality derives from a primordially intentional mind, so matter isn't required to produce what isn't in it.
- The serious naturalist (like Dennett) responds that "simplicity" here is deceptive, and assuming a divine mind transfers the problem rather than solving it.

The preponderance: intentionality alone doesn't prove God's existence conclusively, but it adds noticeable cumulative weight to the theistic hypothesis when combined with evidence from fine-tuning, consciousness, and moral foundations.