A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good

Adams develops a comprehensive theory of virtue that grounds moral excellence in a theistic framework while engaging seriously with secular philosophical traditions. The work represents a significant contribution to virtue ethics by proposing that virtues are forms of excellence in being for the good, where "the good" ultimately refers to God. Adams argues that genuine virtue requires not merely right action but excellence of motivation and being, rooted in appropriate love for what is truly good.

The monograph engages extensively with both historical and contemporary sources. Adams draws on Platonic and Aristotelian traditions while offering sustained critique of modern moral philosophy, particularly Kantian and utilitarian approaches that he views as overly focused on obligation and consequences rather than character and excellence. He examines virtues such as benevolence, justice, courage, and practical wisdom, arguing that these cannot be fully understood without reference to their transcendent ground.

Central to Adams's argument is the claim that moral excellence requires proper orientation toward the Good itself, which he identifies with God. This move distinguishes his position from both secular virtue ethics and divine command theories. Rather than grounding ethics in divine commands, Adams suggests that God's own being constitutes the standard of excellence toward which virtuous dispositions aim. He addresses the Euthyphro problem by arguing that God's nature, not arbitrary divine will, provides the foundation for moral value.

The work critically engages naturalistic accounts of virtue, particularly those emerging from evolutionary psychology and neuroscience. While acknowledging insights from these fields, Adams maintains they cannot adequately explain the full scope of moral excellence or its normative force. He argues that naturalistic reductions of virtue fail to capture the aspirational and transcendent dimensions of moral life.

Adams's contribution lies in demonstrating how virtue ethics can be developed within a theistic framework without reducing to divine command theory or natural law approaches. His sophisticated engagement with secular philosophy, combined with rigorous argumentation for the necessity of transcendent grounding for moral excellence, offers a distinctive position in contemporary metaethics. The monograph thus serves as both a constructive proposal for understanding virtue and a sustained argument for theistic ethics, challenging purely secular accounts while remaining philosophically accessible to diverse audiences.