A World for Us

This monograph presents a sophisticated defense of phenomenalistic idealism, arguing that physical reality exists only insofar as it is organized for conscious perception. Foster develops this position through rigorous engagement with contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics, ultimately proposing that the sensory organization constituting the physical world requires a divine sustainer.

The work begins by examining the relationship between physical objects and sensory experience. Foster argues that our conception of physical reality is fundamentally tied to how objects are disposed to appear to conscious observers. He contends that attempts to conceive of physical objects as existing independently of their potential for perception lead to incoherence. Through careful analysis of spatial properties, causal relations, and the unity of physical objects, Foster builds a case that the physical world consists in nothing more than the systematic organization of sensory possibilities.

Central to Foster's argument is his critique of physicalism and mind-independent realism. He systematically addresses objections from contemporary materialists and scientific realists, arguing that their positions cannot adequately account for the manifest connection between physical reality and conscious experience. His analysis draws on both traditional philosophical arguments and considerations from modern physics, particularly regarding the role of observation in quantum mechanics.

The theological implications emerge in the work's final sections. Foster argues that the organization of sensory possibilities constituting physical reality requires explanation. Since this organization exists independently of finite minds yet consists entirely in possibilities for perception, it must be sustained by an infinite mind. This leads Foster to a form of theistic idealism reminiscent of Berkeley, though developed with greater philosophical sophistication and attention to contemporary debates.

Foster's distinctive contribution lies in his attempt to derive theistic conclusions from purely philosophical analysis of perception and reality, without relying on traditional natural theology. His method combines analytic rigor with phenomenological insights, engaging seriously with naturalistic alternatives while defending an idealist metaphysics. The work represents a significant challenge to physicalist orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of mind, offering a carefully reasoned path from the analysis of sensory experience to divine sustenance. For scholars interested in the intersection of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophical theology, Foster's monograph provides both a formidable defense of idealism and a novel argument for God's existence grounded in the very structure of perceptual reality.