God, Science, and Naturalism

This collection examines the complex relationship between scientific naturalism and theistic belief, arguing that while science does not definitively disprove God's existence, it provides substantial evidential support for naturalism over theism. Draper develops a sophisticated probabilistic framework for evaluating the comparative explanatory power of naturalistic versus theistic worldviews across multiple domains of scientific inquiry.

The work's central thesis contends that the success of methodological naturalism in science constitutes evidence for metaphysical naturalism—the view that nature is all that exists. Draper argues that if theism were true, one would not necessarily expect the consistent success of naturalistic explanations in domains where divine action might reasonably be anticipated. This argument differs from crude scientism by acknowledging that science cannot directly falsify unfalsifiable hypotheses, while maintaining that cumulative scientific findings can shift the balance of probability between competing metaphysical frameworks.

Draper engages critically with natural theology, particularly design arguments that invoke scientific discoveries to support theism. He challenges fine-tuning arguments by demonstrating how selection effects and observational biases undermine probability calculations about cosmic constants. Against intelligent design theorists, he argues that evolutionary biology's naturalistic explanations for biological complexity are not merely adequate but superior to design hypotheses when evaluated by standard scientific criteria of predictive power and theoretical parsimony.

The collection addresses sophisticated theistic responses, including those that embrace methodological naturalism while rejecting its metaphysical implications. Draper examines proposals for divine action that purportedly leave no empirical traces, arguing that such moves, while logically coherent, constitute ad hoc retreats that diminish theism's explanatory ambitions. He particularly scrutinizes attempts to reconcile evolutionary theory with purposive creation, finding them theoretically unmotivated apart from prior theistic commitments.

Methodologically, Draper employs Bayesian probability theory to formalize intuitions about evidential support, distinguishing his approach from both logical positivism's verification principle and contemporary Reformed epistemology's rejection of evidentialism. This probabilistic framework allows him to acknowledge that scientific findings do not logically entail naturalism while maintaining they provide strong inductive support for it.

The work's significance lies in its rigorous articulation of an evidential case for naturalism that avoids both naive scientism and false modesty about science's philosophical implications. By focusing on comparative explanatory success rather than deductive disproof, Draper advances the naturalism-theism debate beyond sterile standoffs about burden of proof toward substantive evaluation of each position's merits.