Hume's Philosophy of Belief

This monograph provides a comprehensive examination of David Hume's epistemology, focusing particularly on how the Scottish philosopher's theory of belief intersects with questions about religious knowledge and the rationality of theism. Flew reconstructs Hume's empiricist framework to demonstrate how it systematically undermines traditional arguments for God's existence and the credibility of religious belief.

The work begins by establishing Hume's fundamental distinction between impressions and ideas, showing how this empiricist foundation restricts legitimate belief to claims traceable to sensory experience. Flew then traces how Hume applies this criterion to religious propositions, arguing that concepts like divine causation, miracles, and providential design fail to meet the standards of rational belief. The author pays particular attention to Hume's treatment of causation, demonstrating how his analysis of causal inference as habit rather than logical necessity devastates the cosmological argument for God's existence.

Flew devotes substantial analysis to Hume's critique of miracles, presenting it not merely as skepticism about particular miracle claims but as a principled epistemological argument about the nature of testimony and probability. He shows how Hume's proportioning of belief to evidence creates an insurmountable barrier to rational acceptance of miraculous events, which by definition violate the regularities upon which all empirical reasoning depends. The discussion extends to Hume's dismantling of the design argument, where Flew explicates how the Scottish philosopher exposes the anthropomorphic projections and logical weaknesses inherent in inferring an intelligent designer from apparent order in nature.

The monograph situates Hume within the broader Enlightenment critique of religious authority while distinguishing his philosophical approach from mere anticlericalism. Flew emphasizes how Hume's naturalistic account of religious belief's psychological origins complements his epistemological critique, presenting religion as a natural but irrational human tendency rather than a pathway to truth. Throughout, the work highlights Hume's influence on subsequent philosophy of religion, particularly his establishment of evidentialist standards that religious claims consistently fail to meet.

Flew's analysis contributes to the God debate by systematically demonstrating how Hume's empiricism, when rigorously applied, leads inexorably to the conclusion that religious belief lacks rational justification. The monograph serves as both a scholarly exposition of Hume's philosophy and an implicit defense of the view that empiricist epistemology undermines theistic belief claims at their foundation.