Morality in a Natural World.. Selected Essays in Metaethics

This collection brings together David Copp's sustained investigation into how moral properties and facts can exist within a naturalistic worldview. The central philosophical challenge Copp addresses is whether objective morality is compatible with metaphysical naturalism—the view that reality consists solely of natural entities and properties studied by the sciences. While this question bears significantly on debates about God's existence, particularly the moral argument for theism, Copp approaches it primarily as a problem in metaethics rather than philosophy of religion.

The volume develops Copp's influential "society-centered" moral theory, which grounds moral standards in what would serve the needs and values of societies rather than in divine commands or non-natural properties. This naturalistic approach attempts to explain moral normativity without appealing to supernatural entities or irreducibly normative facts. Copp argues that moral properties are natural properties—specifically, relational properties involving the standards that societies need to adopt to function successfully and meet their members' basic needs.

A key methodological feature of Copp's work is his commitment to what he calls "methodological naturalism" in ethics. This involves treating moral philosophy as continuous with empirical inquiry, rejecting any fundamental discontinuity between moral and scientific investigation. He engages critically with non-naturalist positions defended by philosophers like G.E. Moore and more recently by Derek Parfit and T.M. Scanlon, who argue that moral properties cannot be reduced to or identified with natural properties.

The essays also address the challenge of moral motivation within a naturalistic framework. If moral facts are natural facts, why should they have any special authority over our actions? Copp develops a response that connects moral requirements to rational agency through the idea of self-grounded reason—the capacity of agents to govern themselves by standards they can rationally endorse.

While Copp does not directly engage theological arguments, his project has clear implications for the moral argument for God's existence. By defending the possibility of objective moral facts within a purely naturalistic ontology, he undermines the premise that moral objectivity requires a divine foundation. His work thus provides resources for those who wish to affirm moral realism while rejecting theistic metaphysics, though he focuses on constructing his positive view rather than critiquing religious alternatives.