Spectres of False Divinity.. Hume's Moral Atheism

This monograph presents a comprehensive reinterpretation of David Hume's position on religion, arguing that beneath his skeptical epistemology lies a committed moral atheism. Holden challenges the conventional reading of Hume as merely an agnostic or skeptic by demonstrating that Hume's critique of religion operates primarily on ethical rather than epistemic grounds. The work meticulously traces how Hume's moral philosophy generates a systematic rejection of theism based on the incompatibility between divine attributes and moral evil.

The study employs intellectual history methodology to reconstruct Hume's arguments within their eighteenth-century context, particularly engaging with the theological controversies surrounding divine justice and theodicy. Holden shows how Hume's analysis of the problem of evil transcends mere skeptical doubt to constitute a positive atheistic conclusion. The author examines Hume's deployment of moral arguments against belief in a benevolent deity, focusing on passages from the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Natural History of Religion that previous scholarship has underemphasized.

Central to Holden's interpretation is the claim that Hume viewed religious belief as generating "false divinities" that corrupt moral judgment and social relations. The monograph demonstrates how Hume's naturalistic account of morality, grounded in sentiment and social utility, fundamentally conflicts with theological ethics. Holden argues that Hume saw the concept of an all-powerful, morally perfect deity as not merely unproven but actively pernicious, fostering superstition, intolerance, and moral distortion.

The work contributes significantly to Hume scholarship by shifting focus from epistemological to ethical dimensions of religious critique. It engages contemporary debates about the relationship between morality and atheism, showing how Hume anticipated later arguments about the moral costs of religious belief. Holden's analysis reveals Hume as a more radical figure than typically acknowledged, one whose naturalism extended beyond methodology to encompass a thoroughgoing rejection of theistic frameworks.

This interpretation matters for understanding the development of secular moral philosophy and the historical emergence of explicitly atheistic positions in Western thought. By recovering Hume's moral atheism, Holden demonstrates how Enlightenment thinkers developed sophisticated ethical arguments against religious belief that remain relevant to contemporary debates about morality, religion, and human flourishing.