The 'Inductive' Argument from Evil: A Dialogue

This article presents a critical examination of William Rowe's evidential argument from evil through a dialogical format between a theist and an atheist. Wykstra structures the piece as a philosophical conversation to illuminate key issues surrounding what he terms the "inductive" argument from evil, which claims that the existence of apparently gratuitous suffering provides strong evidence against God's existence.

The dialogue begins with the atheist character presenting Rowe's central argument: there exist instances of intense suffering that appear to serve no greater good, and if an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God existed, such pointless suffering would not occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that God does not exist. The theist character responds by challenging the crucial inference from "we see no good reason for this suffering" to "there probably is no good reason."

Wykstra develops his central contribution through the theist's articulation of what becomes known as the "CORNEA" principle (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access). This principle suggests that we are entitled to claim "it appears that p" as evidence for p only if it is reasonable to believe that if p were false, we would likely be in a position to know it. Applied to the problem of evil, CORNEA challenges the assumption that humans would be able to discern God's reasons for permitting suffering if such reasons existed.

The philosophical significance of this work lies in its sophisticated epistemological challenge to evidential arguments from evil. Rather than offering theodicies or attempting to explain why God permits evil, Wykstra shifts the debate to questions about human cognitive limitations and the conditions under which absence of evidence constitutes evidence of absence. The dialogue format effectively demonstrates how the dispute ultimately concerns not just the existence of evil, but fundamental questions about what we can reasonably expect to understand given the vast cognitive distance between human and divine perspectives.

Wykstra's approach has proven influential in subsequent discussions of the problem of evil, establishing skeptical theism as a major response to evidential arguments. His work demonstrates how careful attention to epistemological principles can reframe traditional philosophical debates, suggesting that the evidential force of apparently gratuitous evil depends on controversial assumptions about human epistemic access to divine purposes.