The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'

Stephen Wykstra's influential 1984 article addresses a fundamental challenge to evidential arguments from evil against theism. The paper develops what has become known as the "skeptical theist" response to arguments that attempt to infer God's non-existence from the apparent pointlessness of observed suffering.

Wykstra begins by examining William Rowe's evidential argument from evil, which claims that apparently gratuitous suffering provides strong evidence against God's existence. The core of Rowe's argument rests on an inference from "appears to be pointless" to "probably is pointless." Wykstra identifies this inference as vulnerable to what he terms the "Humean obstacle," drawing on Hume's principle that we cannot reliably infer the nature of the whole from limited observations of parts.

The central innovation of Wykstra's analysis lies in his "Condition on Reasonable Epistemic Access" (CORNEA). This principle states that one can justifiably claim "it appears that p" only if it is reasonable to believe that if p were false, things would appear differently. Applied to the problem of evil, CORNEA suggests that given the vast cognitive distance between human and divine perspectives, we should not expect to discern God's purposes for allowing particular instances of suffering, even if such purposes exist.

Wykstra employs illuminating analogies to support his position. He compares the cognitive gap between humans and God to that between a one-month-old infant and its parents. Just as an infant cannot grasp parental reasons for permitting temporary discomfort, humans may be systematically unable to comprehend divine reasons for allowing suffering. This analogical reasoning grounds Wykstra's claim that the appearance of pointless evil does not constitute strong evidence against theism.

The article's philosophical significance extends beyond its specific target. By articulating principled epistemic constraints on appearance-based inferences, Wykstra provides a general framework for evaluating evidential arguments in philosophy of religion. His work initiated the "skeptical theist" tradition, which has generated extensive debate about the limits of human knowledge regarding divine purposes and the evidential weight of evil.

Wykstra's contribution fundamentally shifted the dialectic surrounding the problem of evil. Rather than offering a theodicy that explains why God permits suffering, he argues that theists need not provide such explanations. The absence of discernible divine purposes for suffering, he contends, is precisely what one should expect given theism's own commitments about the nature of God and human cognitive limitations.