The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism

This seminal article presents one of the most influential formulations of the evidential problem of evil in contemporary philosophy of religion. Rowe develops a careful argument that moves from the existence of apparently gratuitous suffering to the probable non-existence of God, thereby establishing what he terms "friendly atheism" - a position that denies God's existence while acknowledging that theists may be rationally justified in their beliefs.

The article's central contribution lies in its precise articulation of the evidential argument from evil. Unlike logical versions that claim God's existence is impossible given evil's reality, Rowe argues that intense suffering occurring without any greater good provides strong evidence against God's existence. He employs the now-famous example of a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire, unobserved by any sentient being, to illustrate suffering that appears to serve no higher purpose. From such instances, Rowe infers it is reasonable to believe that some suffering is genuinely gratuitous - that is, not necessary for any greater good or the prevention of any equal or worse evil.

The argument proceeds through two key premises: first, that there exist instances of intense suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good; second, that an omniscient, wholly good being would prevent such suffering. From these premises, Rowe concludes that God probably does not exist. Importantly, he acknowledges this is an inductive rather than deductive argument, establishing probability rather than certainty.

Rowe's methodological innovation involves distinguishing between different varieties of atheism. He contrasts "unfriendly atheism," which holds that theists are irrational, with his preferred "friendly atheism," which maintains that both theists and atheists may hold their positions rationally given their respective evidence and experiences. This irenic approach has significantly influenced subsequent debates by establishing grounds for respectful philosophical dialogue between theists and atheists.

The article's enduring significance stems from its careful formulation of the evidential problem and its charitable treatment of opposing views. Rowe's argument has generated extensive responses from theists, including skeptical theist strategies that question our ability to discern whether seemingly gratuitous evils truly lack justification. His work remains a touchstone for contemporary discussions of evil and continues to shape how philosophers approach the relationship between suffering and divine existence.