Commonsense Skeptical Theism

Bergmann's essay collection advances a robust defense of skeptical theism as a response to evidential arguments from evil against God's existence. The work systematically develops what Bergmann terms "commonsense skeptical theism," which holds that humans should not expect to grasp God's reasons for permitting evils, given the vast cognitive distance between divine and human minds. This position challenges prominent atheological arguments that infer from apparently gratuitous evils to God's probable non-existence.

The collection engages directly with leading critics of theism, particularly William Rowe's evidential argument from evil and its various formulations. Bergmann argues that Rowe and similar thinkers unjustifiably assume that if God had reasons for permitting observed evils, humans would likely discern them. Against this assumption, Bergmann marshals analogies from ordinary experience—such as the cognitive limitations children face when evaluating parental decisions—to support the claim that our inability to identify divine reasons for evil provides no evidence against God's existence.

Central to Bergmann's approach is his defense of four "skeptical theist theses" concerning human cognitive limitations regarding possible goods, evils, and their interconnections. He argues these theses are both commonsensical and sufficient to block inferences from inscrutable evils to pointless evils. The work carefully distinguishes this position from more radical forms of skepticism, arguing that skeptical theism need not lead to moral paralysis or general skepticism about value judgments.

The essays address major objections to skeptical theism, including charges that it undermines ordinary moral reasoning, conflicts with certain religious practices like petitionary prayer, or generates unwelcome skepticism about divine revelation. Bergmann develops nuanced responses showing how skeptical theism remains compatible with robust moral knowledge and religious practice. He also examines the position's implications for discussions of divine hiddenness and religious diversity.

Bergmann's contribution lies not merely in defending theism against the problem of evil, but in articulating a philosophically sophisticated account of appropriate epistemic humility regarding divine purposes. The work demonstrates how theists can consistently maintain both belief in an omniscient, morally perfect God and acknowledgment of genuine puzzlement about specific instances of suffering. This collection has become a touchstone in contemporary philosophy of religion, establishing skeptical theism as a major position requiring engagement from both theistic and atheistic philosophers.