Existential Inertia and Classical Theistic Proofs

This monograph presents a comprehensive challenge to classical theistic proofs by developing and defending the principle of existential inertia against the doctrine of divine conservation. Schmid argues that contingent objects possess an inherent tendency to persist in existence without requiring continuous divine sustenance, thereby undermining a crucial premise in many traditional arguments for God's existence.

The work systematically examines how existential inertia conflicts with classical theistic metaphysics, particularly the widespread assumption that created beings require God's ongoing causal activity to remain in being. Schmid contends that just as objects exhibit inertial tendencies in motion, they similarly exhibit inertial tendencies in existence itself. This principle, if correct, would render unnecessary the theistic postulate of divine conservation and weaken cosmological arguments that depend on the contingency and dependence of finite beings.

Schmid engages extensively with the Thomistic tradition, addressing objections from contemporary neo-Thomist philosophers who maintain that existential inertia is metaphysically impossible. He examines their arguments that existence is not a state but an act requiring continuous actualization, and that the essence-existence distinction in contingent beings necessitates an external cause for their continued being. The author provides detailed responses to these objections, arguing that they rest on questionable metaphysical assumptions about the nature of existence and causation.

The monograph also explores how existential inertia relates to other philosophical debates, including discussions of temporal parts, persistence conditions, and the metaphysics of time. Schmid argues that his principle is compatible with various metaphysical frameworks and does not require commitment to any particular theory of time or persistence. He further contends that existential inertia offers a more parsimonious explanation for the continued existence of objects than divine conservation.

The work's significance lies in its potential to undermine a foundational assumption of many classical theistic proofs. If contingent beings can persist without divine conservation, then arguments from contingency lose much of their force, as the existence of contingent beings would not necessarily point to a necessary being as their sustainer. Schmid's careful analysis challenges theistic philosophers to either abandon divine conservation or provide stronger arguments for its necessity. The monograph represents a significant contribution to contemporary debates about the metaphysical foundations of natural theology.