Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality

This monograph presents a comprehensive case for theistic metaethics, arguing that objective moral values and obligations require God as their ontological foundation. Baggett develops what he terms a "moral argument for God," contending that naturalistic accounts of morality fail to provide adequate grounding for the moral phenomena humans universally experience and recognize.

The work systematically examines competing secular theories of ethics, including evolutionary explanations, social contract theories, and various forms of moral realism. Baggett argues that each naturalistic approach faces insurmountable difficulties in accounting for the binding nature of moral obligations, the categorical character of moral imperatives, and the intrinsic value of human persons. He particularly focuses on what he calls the "Euthyphro problem" for naturalism—the challenge of explaining why evolved creatures should regard their moral intuitions as tracking objective moral truth rather than mere survival advantages.

Central to Baggett's positive case is his defense of a modified divine command theory that avoids the standard Euthyphro dilemma. He argues that moral obligations are grounded in God's commands, while God's perfectly good nature ensures these commands align with objective moral values. This framework, he contends, uniquely explains both the authority and the content of morality. The work engages extensively with contemporary critics of theistic ethics, particularly responding to objections raised by philosophers like Erik Wielenberg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Louise Antony.

Baggett employs an abductive methodology, arguing that theism provides the best explanation for recognized moral phenomena. He draws on both analytic philosophy and phenomenological insights to examine moral experience, incorporating discussions of moral motivation, moral transformation, and moral hope. The monograph also addresses the problem of evil as a potential defeater for theistic ethics, offering a theodicy that emphasizes the moral development of free creatures.

The work's significance lies in its comprehensive engagement with current debates in metaethics from an explicitly theistic perspective. While many contemporary philosophers assume naturalism in their moral theorizing, Baggett challenges this assumption by demonstrating alleged explanatory gaps in secular accounts. His arguments contribute to broader discussions about the relationship between religious worldviews and moral philosophy, making the case that taking morality seriously provides rational grounds for theistic belief. The monograph thus serves both as a defense of theistic ethics and as an argument for theism itself.