Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism

This monograph presents a systematic defense of epistemic externalism against internalist objections, with significant implications for religious epistemology and debates about justified belief in God. Bergmann develops a comprehensive externalist theory of justification that allows beliefs to be justified without the believer having reflective awareness of what makes them justified.

The work directly challenges the internalist requirement that justified belief demands some form of internal access to one's justifying grounds. Bergmann argues that this requirement leads to vicious regresses and skeptical conclusions. He contends that many of our properly basic beliefs, including potentially religious ones, can be justified through reliable cognitive processes without the believer being aware of these processes or their reliability. This position builds on and refines the reliabilist tradition associated with Alvin Goldman while incorporating insights from proper functionalism.

Central to Bergmann's argument is his critique of what he terms the "Subject's Perspective Objection" to externalism. This objection holds that externalist accounts of justification are inadequate because they ignore the subject's own perspective on their reasons for belief. Bergmann systematically dismantles various versions of this objection, arguing that the internalist's emphasis on the subject's perspective either leads to infinite regress problems or collapses into an implausible form of infallibilism.

The implications for religious epistemology are substantial, though not always explicitly drawn out. Bergmann's externalism provides theoretical support for reformed epistemologists like Alvin Plantinga who argue that belief in God can be properly basic and justified without argument or evidence accessible to the believer. If justification does not require awareness of what justifies one's beliefs, then religious believers need not be able to articulate their grounds for belief to be epistemically responsible.

Bergmann engages extensively with contemporary epistemologists including Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, and Laurence BonJour, offering detailed responses to their internalist arguments. His defense of externalism employs rigorous analytic methodology, carefully distinguishing between different types of awareness and showing how each type, if required for justification, generates insurmountable philosophical problems.

The monograph's significance extends beyond religious epistemology to fundamental questions about the nature of knowledge and rational belief. By defending the possibility of justification without awareness, Bergmann provides important theoretical resources for those who maintain that religious belief can be epistemically appropriate even when believers cannot fully articulate their reasons.