The Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief

Theodore Drange's article presents a systematic examination of two distinct yet related challenges to theistic belief: the argument from evil and the argument from nonbelief. While the problem of evil has received extensive philosophical attention, Drange contends that the argument from nonbelief deserves equal consideration as a potentially more decisive challenge to classical theism.

The argument from evil, in Drange's analysis, confronts the apparent incompatibility between the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God and the presence of suffering in the world. Drange surveys various formulations of this argument, distinguishing between logical and evidential versions, and examines theistic responses ranging from free will defenses to skeptical theism. He notes that while the logical problem of evil has largely been addressed through Plantinga's free will defense, the evidential problem remains philosophically vigorous.

The argument from nonbelief, which Drange develops more extensively, posits that widespread nonbelief in God is incompatible with the existence of a God who desires a relationship with all humans. This argument gains particular force when considering those who have never encountered the relevant religious claims or who, despite sincere investigation, remain unconvinced. Drange argues that if God existed and desired belief, such widespread nonbelief would be inexplicable.

Drange's methodological approach involves careful conceptual analysis and logical argumentation. He distinguishes his arguments from purely emotional objections to theism, maintaining that both evil and nonbelief present cognitive challenges that demand philosophical responses. His work engages critically with contemporary defenses of theism, including those offered by Plantinga, Swinburne, and van Inwagen.

The significance of Drange's contribution lies in his systematic treatment of nonbelief as a philosophical problem comparable to evil. By arguing that nonbelief presents an independent challenge to theism, he expands the conceptual toolkit available to critics of classical theism. His analysis suggests that even if theists successfully address the problem of evil, they must still contend with explaining why an all-loving God would permit honest nonbelief.

Drange's work represents an important development in philosophy of religion by establishing the argument from nonbelief as a serious philosophical challenge requiring sophisticated theistic responses. His careful argumentation demonstrates that questions about divine hiddenness and the distribution of religious belief pose fundamental difficulties for traditional theistic worldviews.