Nonbelief and Evil

This monograph presents a systematic philosophical case against theism by combining two distinct but related arguments: the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness. Drange develops what he terms the "Argument from Nonbelief" as a powerful complement to traditional formulations of the problem of evil, contending that the existence of widespread nonbelief in God constitutes evidence against God's existence that is at least as compelling as the existence of suffering.

The work's central innovation lies in its rigorous development of divine hiddenness as an independent atheological argument. Drange argues that if an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly loving God existed, such a being would ensure that all people capable of belief would have clear evidence of divine existence. The persistence of reasonable nonbelief among sincere seekers therefore counts as strong evidence against theism. This argument sidesteps many of the theodicies developed in response to the problem of evil, as it is difficult to explain why a loving God would permit honest seekers to remain in ignorance of divine existence.

Drange employs the tools of analytic philosophy throughout, offering precise definitions, formal argument structures, and careful consideration of objections. He systematically examines and rejects various theistic responses, including appeals to human free will, the value of faith, and divine inscrutability. The work engages directly with contemporary theistic philosophers, particularly those who have developed sophisticated defenses against the logical and evidential problems of evil.

The monograph's treatment of evil focuses on demonstrating that known theodicies fail to adequately explain the amount and distribution of suffering in the world. Drange pays particular attention to cases of apparently gratuitous evil that serve no discernible greater good. By combining this traditional atheological argument with his argument from nonbelief, he constructs a cumulative case that he maintains overwhelms theistic responses.

The significance of this work lies in its expansion of the atheological toolkit beyond traditional formulations of the problem of evil. By establishing divine hiddenness as an equally formidable challenge to theism, Drange has influenced subsequent debates in philosophy of religion. His analytical rigor and systematic approach exemplify the methods of contemporary atheistic philosophy, while his dual-pronged strategy has prompted new developments in both atheistic argumentation and theistic counter-arguments.