The Myth of Morality

This monograph presents a systematic error theory of moral discourse, arguing that all moral claims are false because they presuppose the existence of objective moral properties that do not exist. Joyce develops his position through careful conceptual analysis and engagement with evolutionary psychology, ultimately defending moral fictionalism as the appropriate response to moral nihilism.

The work begins by analyzing the conceptual commitments of ordinary moral discourse. Joyce argues that moral language necessarily involves claims about objective prescriptivity - the idea that certain actions are required or forbidden regardless of our desires, interests, or social conventions. He contends that when someone claims "torture is wrong," they commit themselves to more than expressing disapproval or noting social conventions; they assert something categorically binding. This conceptual analysis draws on linguistic evidence and phenomenological observations about how moral requirements present themselves to us as external demands.

Joyce then argues that no such objective prescriptive properties exist in the natural world. He examines various attempts to ground morality in natural facts - including neo-Humean theories, response-dependent accounts, and moral realism - finding each inadequate to capture the authority that moral discourse presupposes. The evolutionary genealogy of moral thinking features prominently in his argument. Joyce suggests that natural selection would favor creatures who experience moral phenomena as objective and inescapable, even if no such properties exist, because this would enhance social cooperation and individual fitness.

The final section addresses practical implications. Rather than advocating elimination of moral discourse, Joyce defends fictionalism - continuing to use moral language while recognizing its fundamental falsity. He argues this approach preserves the social benefits of moral practice without philosophical confusion. This distinguishes his position from both eliminativists who recommend abandoning moral talk and conservationists who deny that discovering morality's mythical status should change our practices.

The monograph makes significant contributions to metaethics by combining rigorous conceptual analysis with empirical considerations from evolutionary biology. Joyce's error theory challenges both moral realists and antirealists who attempt to preserve morality's normative force while denying objective moral facts. His fictionalist solution offers a philosophically coherent way to navigate the practical implications of moral skepticism, though it raises questions about whether genuine moral commitment remains possible once we recognize morality as myth.