The equivocal predication thesis holds that terms applied to God and creatures share no common meaning whatsoever, such that when we say "God is wise" and "Socrates is wise," the word "wise" functions as a pure homonym with entirely distinct meanings in each case. This position maintains that divine attributes are so radically different from their creaturely counterparts that no semantic overlap exists between them. The thesis typically emerges from strong commitments to divine transcendence and simplicity, arguing that any shared meaning would compromise God's absolute otherness by subjecting the divine to creaturely categories. Proponents argue this preserves divine mystery while avoiding anthropomorphism.
The position finds roots in Pseudo-Dionysius (5th-6th century), whose "Divine Names" emphasized God's radical transcendence beyond all predication. Moses Maimonides developed the most influential medieval formulation in his "Guide for the Perplexed" (1190), arguing that divine attributes function purely negatively or relationally. Within Islamic thought, certain Ashʿarite theologians like al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013) approached this view when discussing divine attributes (ṣifāt), though most stopped short of pure equivocation. The thesis gained renewed attention through postmodern thinkers like Jean-Luc Marion in "God Without Being" (1982), who argued that conceptual idolatry results from assuming univocal predication between God and creatures.
The primary objection concerns the collapse into agnosticism: if "wise" means something entirely different when applied to God, then statements about God become meaningless and religious language loses cognitive content. Critics like Thomas Aquinas argued this makes revelation impossible and prayer incoherent. Defenders respond that equivocation preserves divine transcendence and that religious language functions non-cognitively through mystical encounter or apophatic practice. A second objection notes that Scripture itself draws comparisons between divine and human attributes, suggesting some commonality. Proponents reply that such comparisons function pedagogically without implying real similarity, or that revelation itself transcends ordinary semantic rules.
Unlike analogical predication, which maintains proportional similarity between divine and creaturely attributes, equivocal predication denies any commonality. While via negativa focuses on what God is not, equivocation makes a stronger claim about the complete semantic discontinuity of positive statements. Univocal predication, its direct opposite, insists terms mean exactly the same when applied to God and creatures. Symbolic interpretation treats religious language as metaphorical while potentially maintaining some cognitive content, whereas pure equivocation denies even metaphorical connection.