Analogical predication holds that religious language about God operates through analogy, where terms applied to both God and creatures share meaning that is neither wholly identical (univocal) nor entirely different (equivocal), but proportionally related. This position maintains that when we say "God is good" and "humans are good," the term "good" carries related but distinct meanings, with the divine instantiation serving as the primary analogate from which creaturely goodness derives. The theory attempts to preserve meaningful discourse about God while respecting divine transcendence, arguing that our concepts drawn from finite experience can legitimately refer to infinite reality through a relationship of proportional similarity.
The doctrine finds its classical articulation in Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I.13), who developed Aristotle's notion of pros hen equivocation into a sophisticated theory of theological predication. Medieval Islamic philosophers like Ibn Sīnā (al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt) explored similar territory through the concept of tashkīk al-wujūd (gradation of existence), while Jewish thinkers like Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed) grappled with related issues. The Thomistic tradition was refined by Cajetan (De Nominum Analogia, 1498) and John of St. Thomas (Cursus Philosophicus), while modern defenders include E.L. Mascall (Existence and Analogy, 1949), Ralph McInerny (The Logic of Analogy, 1961), and David Burrell (Analogy and Philosophical Language, 1973).
Critics argue that analogical predication collapses into either univocity or equivocity when pressed for precision. Duns Scotus contended that without some univocal concept of being, no meaningful predication about God is possible, while William of Ockham argued that analogy reduces to equivocation with extrinsic attribution. Contemporary philosophers like Kai Nielsen maintain that analogical language remains cognitively meaningless without specifiable similarity conditions. Defenders respond that analogy operates through causal participation rather than conceptual comparison, that the objection misunderstands the metaphysical basis of analogical reference, and that demanding univocal precision imposes an inappropriate standard on transcendent discourse.
Analogical predication differs from univocal predication by denying identical meaning across divine and creaturely applications, from equivocal predication by maintaining genuine semantic connection, from via negativa by affirming positive content in God-talk, and from symbolic interpretation by claiming literal though analogical reference rather than merely metaphorical meaning.