Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil

This essay examines William Rowe's evidential argument from evil against theism, focusing on what Wykstra terms "noseeum" reasoning - the inference from our inability to see reasons for certain evils to the probable non-existence of such reasons. Wykstra analyzes how Rowe's argument has evolved through various formulations while maintaining its core structure: certain instances of apparently gratuitous suffering provide strong evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God.

The essay traces Rowe's argument from its initial 1979 formulation through subsequent refinements in response to critics. Central to Wykstra's analysis is the epistemic principle underlying Rowe's reasoning - that if God existed and had reasons for permitting intense suffering, we would likely be able to discern those reasons. Wykstra challenges this assumption by developing what he calls the "CORNEA" principle (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), which requires that we have reasonable epistemic access to the relevant domain before making inferences from what appears to be the case to what probably is the case.

Wykstra argues that given the vast cognitive and moral distance between finite humans and an infinite God, we should expect many divine reasons for permitting evil to be beyond our ken - much as a parent's reasons for certain decisions remain opaque to young children. He terms this the "parent analogy" and uses it to undermine the noseeum inference at the heart of Rowe's argument. The essay engages with Rowe's responses to this skeptical theist position, including Rowe's contention that even if we cannot identify specific reasons for particular evils, the sheer amount and intensity of suffering in the world still counts strongly against theism.

The work makes a significant contribution to the philosophy of religion by articulating and defending skeptical theism as a response to evidential arguments from evil. Wykstra's CORNEA principle has become influential in subsequent discussions, shifting debate toward questions about the conditions under which our cognitive limitations do or do not undermine evidential inferences. His analysis demonstrates how apparently straightforward empirical observations about evil require complex epistemic assumptions that can be challenged. The essay thus illuminates fundamental questions about human cognitive capacities and their relevance to evaluating theistic belief.