Scientism: Science, Ethics, and Religion

This monograph provides a systematic philosophical analysis of scientism, examining the complex relationships between science, ethics, and religion in contemporary intellectual discourse. Stenmark develops a nuanced taxonomy of scientistic positions, distinguishing between various forms of epistemic, ontological, and axiological scientism while evaluating their philosophical coherence and implications for religious belief.

The work begins by clarifying conceptual confusions surrounding the term "scientism," which Stenmark argues has been deployed imprecisely in both academic and popular contexts. He identifies scientism as the view that the boundaries of science should be expanded beyond its traditional domain, distinguishing this from the legitimate authority of science within its proper sphere. Through careful analytical philosophy, Stenmark delineates multiple versions of scientism: from modest claims about scientific method's superiority in empirical matters to radical assertions that science provides the only genuine knowledge or that scientific rationality should govern all human concerns including ethics and religion.

Central to Stenmark's argument is his critique of what he terms "epistemic imperialism" - the attempt to extend scientific methods and standards to domains where they may be inappropriate or insufficient. He examines how prominent advocates of scientism, including figures from the New Atheist movement and scientific naturalists, often conflate methodological naturalism (a legitimate scientific approach) with metaphysical naturalism (a philosophical worldview). This conflation, Stenmark demonstrates, leads to category errors when addressing questions of meaning, value, and ultimate reality.

The monograph's particular contribution to the God debate lies in its demonstration that scientism, rather than being a straightforward consequence of scientific progress, represents a philosophical stance that requires justification beyond empirical evidence. Stenmark argues that strong forms of scientism are self-refuting, as the claim that only scientific knowledge is valid cannot itself be established through scientific method. He further contends that science, while supremely successful in its domain, cannot address fundamental questions about moral values, existential meaning, or religious truth without overstepping its epistemic boundaries.

Stenmark's analysis reveals how the science-religion dialogue has been distorted by scientistic assumptions on one side and anti-scientific attitudes on the other. By providing conceptual clarity and philosophical rigor, the work creates space for a more productive engagement between scientific and religious perspectives, suggesting that recognizing the proper limits of different forms of inquiry enables rather than undermines genuine dialogue about ultimate questions.