Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

This edited volume examines Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN), one of the most significant philosophical challenges to naturalistic worldviews in contemporary philosophy of religion. Beilby assembles leading philosophers to evaluate Plantinga's claim that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism generates an epistemic defeater for the reliability of human cognitive faculties, ultimately undermining the rational acceptability of naturalism itself.

Plantinga's argument, refined over several decades, contends that if both naturalism and evolution are true, then the probability that human cognitive faculties produce reliable beliefs is low or inscrutable. Since naturalists typically hold that beliefs arise from neurophysiological states selected for survival rather than truth, they have no reason to trust their own cognitive faculties, including their belief in naturalism. This generates what Plantinga calls a "defeater" for naturalism—the position defeats itself when combined with evolutionary theory.

The volume presents a comprehensive philosophical dialogue, featuring Plantinga's latest formulation of the argument followed by eleven critical responses from philosophers representing diverse perspectives. Contributors include naturalists like Michael Ruse and Evan Fales, who challenge Plantinga's probability assessments and his understanding of how evolution shapes cognitive reliability. Others, such as William Alston and Ernest Sosa, engage with the epistemological machinery of the argument, questioning whether the alleged defeater genuinely threatens naturalistic epistemology.

Beilby's collection illuminates the broader stakes of this debate for the God question. If successful, Plantinga's argument would demonstrate that naturalism—the metaphysical foundation for most contemporary atheism—cannot coherently account for human reason and knowledge. This would indirectly support theistic alternatives that ground cognitive reliability in divine design. The volume captures the technical sophistication required to adjudicate between naturalistic and theistic explanations of human cognition, showing how evolutionary biology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind converge in fundamental questions about reality's nature.

The book's significance extends beyond academic philosophy, as it addresses whether scientific naturalism can provide a complete worldview without self-contradiction. By presenting the strongest formulations and criticisms of the EAAN, Beilby provides essential resources for understanding one of the most ingenious attempts to demonstrate naturalism's internal incoherence, thereby opening intellectual space for theistic alternatives in contemporary philosophical discourse.