دانييل دينيت
1942–2024
Identity via typographic mark
Catalogue·Authors·Secular Naturalist·Dennett, Daniel
Canonical author · 4 canonical works
Dennett, Daniel

Daniel Dennett

دانييل دينيت

1942–2024 CE1361–1446 AHAmerican
Active in Medford, Massachusetts, Oxford
philosopher · cognitive scientist · philosopher of mind · atheist public intellectualSecular NaturalistAnalytic Philosophy
7 works in this database · 4 canonical · Engaged with 32 other authors
i.

Editorial biography

Daniel Clement Dennett III (1942–2024) was an American philosopher associated with Tufts University, where he co-directed the Center for Cognitive Studies for decades. Trained at Harvard and Oxford (under Gilbert Ryle), he developed a distinctive naturalist program in philosophy of mind, articulated in The Intentional Stance (1987) and Consciousness Explained (1991), which advanced a functionalist, heterophenomenological account of mind that critics such as John Searle, David Chalmers, and Thomas Nagel charged with eliminating rather than explaining qualia. In Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995) Dennett defended a thoroughgoing adaptationism and presented natural selection as a 'universal acid' dissolving traditional teleological and theological frameworks, provoking sharp exchanges with Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin. With Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens, he became one of the 'Four Horsemen' of New Atheism. Breaking the Spell (2006) proposed that religion itself be subjected to scientific study as a cultural-evolutionary phenomenon, drawing on memetics and cognitive science of religion. Critics including Alvin Plantinga, Alister McGrath, and Terry Eagleton accused him of scientism and of conflating naturalistic explanation with debunking; Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism directly targeted his commitments. Dennett also defended compatibilist free will (Elbow Room; Freedom Evolves) and a deflationary view of religious belief, arguing for transparent inquiry into faith without privileging it epistemically.

ii.

Works in this database

TitleYearGenreArgument engagedTier
The Intentional Stance
الموقف القصدي
1987
1408 AH
Monographconsciousness-argument · discussed · scientific-naturalism · discussedIncluded
Consciousness Explained
تفسير الوعي
1992
1413 AH
Monographscientific-naturalism · discussed · consciousness-argument · discussed★ Canonical
Darwin's Dangerous Idea.. Evolution and the meanings of Life
فكرة داروين الخطيرة.. التطور ومعاني الحياة
1996
1417 AH
Monographscientific-naturalism · discussed · science-and-religion-argument · discussed★ Canonical
Freedom Evolves
الحرية تتطور
2003
1424 AH
Monographscientific-naturalism · discussed · consciousness-argument · discussedIncluded
Breaking the Spell.. Religion as a Natural Phenomenon
كسر التعويذة.. الدين بوصفه ظاهرة طبيعية
2006
1427 AH
Monographcritique-of-religion · discussed · sociological · discussed★ Canonical
From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds
من البكتيريا إلى باخ والعودة: تطور العقول
2017
1439 AH
Monographscientific-naturalism · discussed · consciousness-argument · discussed +1 moreIncluded
Science and Religion: Are They Compatible?
العلم والدين: هل هما متوافقان؟
Monographscience-and-religion-argument · discussed★ Canonical
iii.

Intellectual engagement

iv.

Argument families engaged

scientific naturalism
scientific naturalism · 5 works
proponent
Consciousness Argument
Consciousness Argument · 4 works
Discussed
Science and Religion Argument
Science and Religion Argument · 3 works
Discussed
critique of religion
critique of religion · 1 work
proponent
Sociological Argument
Sociological Argument · 1 work
Discussed
Design Argument
Design Argument · 0 works
proponent
Problem of Evil
Problem of Evil · 0 works
proponent
v.

Traditions and methodologies

Primary tradition
Secular Naturalist
Primary methodology
Analytic Philosophy
Secondary methodologies
Descriptive Analysis · Psychology of Religion · Philosophy of Science · Philosophy of Mind · Cognitive Science of Religion
vi.

Where to find this author

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